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In \h6 suor6m6 Gourt o1 th6 
Sta'6 oi utan 
OCTOBER TERM, 1929 
PATRICK SlJLLI\rAN, AND 
ELI.Z..-\.BETH SULLIVAN, His WIFB, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JOHX G. COXDA_S, 
Defendant and Respondent._ 
APPELL.!L\'"TS' BRIEF. 
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover dam-
ages from the defendant for the alleged unlawful 
trespass of defendant's livestock upon plaintiffs' 
real property, and for an injunction restraining de-
fendant from further trespassing upon plaintiffs' 
lood. 
Defendant filed an amended answer in the way 
of a general denial, and by way of affirmative de-
fense. commencing with paragraph 14 of _defenant'~ 
an~wer, (Abst. 17), defendant alleges as follows: 
"14. For a further answer and defense to said 
Fifth Cause of action, defendant alleges that he 
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is the owner, entitled to, possession and in pos-
s,ess;ion of certain lands in White Pine Canyon, 
Summit C'ounty, Stat~ of Utah, and that 
various ot!1er persons are the owners of other 
tracts of land in said canyon, both above, be1o·w, 
and adjoining the said lands o'vned by this de-
fendant. That there is no\v · and has been for 
more tha.n sixty ye~ars past, a well traveled road 
up said White Pine Canyon, branching from the 
main State Highway and running through and 
beyond the said la1nds of the defendant and 
through the lands owned in said canyon by said 
other persons. That said road is a publlic hi,qh-
~uay and has been used continuously by the de-
fe1idant and by his predecessors in interest and 
by the aforesaid Otljners of land in said White 
P~ine Canyon a,nd vicinity and by the public gen-
erally, and especially by the residents of Park 
r:ity and of Surn1ni.t County, State of Utah, for 
1nore than s1~xty yenrs past. That the defend-
ant does claim the rig-ht to use said road for 
'-~ 
ingress to and egress from his said land in 
White Pine Ca1nyon. That said road runs 
through a portion of the tract of land described 
in the first paragraph of the plaintiffs' com-
plaint herein, and is the same road as the1 road 
referred to in the Fifth Cause of Action of said 
complaint. 
15. Further answering, the defendant al-
leges that the said road referred to in paragraph 
14 of this kA.;mended Answer, was at the time 
of the commencement of this action a pub1ic 
highway ·by prescription and by having been 
ns:ed continuously, op~enly, notoriously and un-
der .a claim of right by the publuc generally and 
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3 
by the d~ft1.ndant and by his predect~::)~or~ in in-
t~r~st for n1ore than t\\~(\nty years. 
16. Furth~r answPring·. the defendn111t al-
...... 
leg-t"\s that he ha=-' inYe~ted more than RixtY-FiYl~ 
~ . 
Hundred ($6500.00) Dollars in purchasing-
lands and improvement~. including a d\velling 
house.. and in making improvements on said 
land so purchased by him in ~aid \V'hit~ 1-"'ine 
Can~·on. That sRid lands comprise Thirteen 
Hundrffi Sixty-Six (1366) acres, a.nd that the 
sole and only m~ans of ingress to and egress 
from said lands Rnd improvem'ents and saicl 
dwelling hons~. owing to the topography of the 
country. is over the ~aid road described in pa.r-
llgraph 14 of this ~-\meonded Answer, and that 
said road is absolute!, necessary to the proper 
enjoyment by the defendant of his lands. im-
provements and dwelling house in said White 
Pine Canyon, and said defendant will suffer ir-
reparable dama~e if he is deprived of the free 
use of said road for all purposes. 
17. Further answerin!S, the defendant a~I­
leges that the said plaintiffs and their prede-
cessors in interest in the lands described in the 
first paragraph of plaintiffs' complaint herein, 
which lands plaintiffs claim they own, but which 
claim of ownership defendant denies. with full 
knowledge thereof permitted and acquiesced in 
the free use of said road described in paragraph 
14 of this Amended Answer by the public gen-
erally and by the defendant and his predece~­
sors in interest in driving livestock over said 
road and in using said road for all kinds of 
vehicular traffic, and that said plaintiffs and 
their predecessors in interest with full knowl-
edg-p thereof permitted and acquiesced in the 
free use of said roa.d by the defendant and his 
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4 
predesessors in intere~st in hauling building ma-
terial and supplie-s over said road to be used 
in thG construction of defendant's said d"\\r.elling 
house, barns, blacksmith shop,· and other out-
buildings, fences, and etc., well knowing that 
defendant rund his predecessors in interest had 
no other means of access to his said lands, im-
provements, and dwelling house, and by reason 
thereof the defe~ndant alleges that the plaintiffs 
are estopped from now claiming that the said 
road is not a publtic road and are also estopped 
from now claiming that defendant has not the 
right to use said road for all purposes as a 
n1eans of ingress to and egre:ss -from his said 
lands, improvements, and dw-elling house." 
(Italics ours). 
Defendant, continuing said ans,ver and by ·way 
of counterclaim ( Ahst. 20), aJleges as follows: 
'' By way of countetrclaim against the said 
plaintiffs, the defendant allege's: 
1. That defendant is now and for several 
years last past has been the owner, in posses-
sion and entitled to the possession of thH fol-
lo,ving d<~scribed lands in Summit County, 
state of Utah: 
All of Lots 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16~ 
Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, 
S. L. M., c.omprising 629 acres. 
Also 120 acres in Section 12, Township 2 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian: 
Also 120 acres in Section 12, Township 2 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian: 
Also Lots 6 and 9 in Section 6, Township 
2 South, Range 4 East, and 520 .acres in Section 
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7, 'rownship :! South, Rangt.l 4 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, compri~ing altogether 1366 acres. 
2. That said Lots 9 and 10 in Section 1, 
To"11ship ~ South, Range 3 En.st, inunediatelly 
adjoin lots 7 and S of ~aid Section 1, ". hich are 
the lands describeti in the first paragraph of 
11laintiffs' complaint herein. 
3. That all of the afcJr~said lands are sit-
uated in W"hat i:' kno"·n as • 'Vhite Pine Canyon' 
t"-o or three miles uorthwesterlv from Park 
• <J 
City, in Summit County, State of Utah. 
4. That various other persons, in addition 
to defeondant. own other tracts of land in said 
White Pine Canyon both above, belo'v and ad-
j-)~nllJ? the ~aid Ianrl ownt--d by the defendant. 
That th~ major portion of said land is suitable 
solely for grazing Ji,·estock thereon, and a small 
portion thereof i~ susceptible of cultivation and 
suitable for the raising of hay. 
5. The defendaBt alleges that he is the 
owner, entitled to the possession amd in posses-
sion of certain lands in White Pine Canyon, 
Summit County, State of Utah, and that vari-
ous other persons are the owners of other tracts 
of land in said canyon, both a.bove. below, .and 
adjoining the said lands owned by the defend-
ant. That there is now and has been for more 
than .~ixty years past a well traveled road up 
said White Pine Canyon. branching from the 
main State Higohway and runnin_go through and 
bevond the said lands of the defendant and 
th~ough the land~ owned in said canyon by said 
other persons. That Raid road is a public high-
u·ny n.nd b:ts been used continuously by the de-
fenrlant and by his predecessors in interest and 
hy thP aforesaid ownerB of land in sa.id White 
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Pine Canyon and vicinity and by the public 
generally, and especially by the residents of 
Park City and of Summit County, State of 
lJtah, for more than S'ixty years past.. That the 
defendant does claim the right to use said road 
for ingress to and egress from his said land in 
vVhite PJne Canyon. That said road runs 
through a portion of the- tract of land described 
in the first paragraph of the plaintiffs' com-
plaint herein, to-wit: 
Lot 8, S·e.ction 1, Township 2 South, Range 
.J_ East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
6. The defendant a.ll~ge~ that the /.said 
road re,ferred to in paragraph 5 of this counter-
claim was at the time of the commencement of 
this action a public highUJ-ay by prescription and 
by having been used continuously~ openly, no-
toriously, and under claim of right, by tl1e plib.-
lic generally and by the defendant and by his 
predecessors in interest for more than twe.nty 
yea.rs .. 
7. The defendant alleges that he has in-
vest·ed more than Sixty-Five Hundred ($6500.-
00) Dollars in purchasing lands and improve-
ments, including a dwelling house, and in mak-
ing improvements on sa,id land so purchased by 
hiln in said \Vhit •. ' Pine Canyon. That said 
lands comp1risa Thirteetn-Rundred I Sixt~-Six 
(1366) acres and that the sole and o11ly mennR. 
of ingress to and egress from said lands and 
improvements and sa!id dwelling house, owing 
to the topo.nraph.~t of the country, is over the 
said road described in paragraph 5. of this 
counterclajm, and tha1t said road is absolutPly 
necessary to thP proper enjoyme·nt by the de-
fendant of his lands, improv0m0nts nnd dw·ell-
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ing hou::;e in said \Vhite Pine Canyon, tUld su~iJ 
deiend.ant \vill ~ufft.\r irn.\parnble drunage if he 
i~ depriYed ot' the fret~ ust\ of said road for all 
purpt)'Sl~~. 
~- The d~fendant alleges that the said 
plaintiff~ and tht~ir predece-ssors in intt~rPst in 
the land-s Lle-scrib~l in the first paragraph of 
plaiutitl'-s · C{)mplaint her~in, \Yhich lands plain-
tiff~ claim to o'rn, but. which claim of ownership 
defendant denies. with full knowledge thereof 
permitted a.nd acqui(·~eed in the fretL uSJe of said 
r,)ad described in paragraph 5 of this counter-
claim by the public generally and by the de-
fendant and his predecessors in interest in 
driving liYestock or~r said road and in using 
s~:.id road for all kinds of z·ehicular traffic, and 
that said plaintiffs and their predecessors in 
interest with full knowlroge thereof permitted 
and acquiesced in the free use of said road by 
the defendant and his predecessors in interest 
in hauling building material and supplies over 
said road to be used in construction of de~ 
fendant 's said dwelling house, barns, black-
smith shop, and other out-buildings, fences, and 
etc., well knowing that the defendant al!ld his 
predecessors in interest had no other means of 
access to his lands. improvements, and dwelling 
house, and by reason thereof the defendant al-
legPs that the plaintiffs are estopped from now 
claiming that the said road is not a public road 
and are also estopped from now claiming that 
defendant has not the right to use said road 
for all purp.oses as a means of ingress to and 
e~ress from hi~ said lands, improvements, and 
dwelling house. . 
9. Tbt~t in the month of February. 192R, 
tl1e rlPfendant had stored on his saicl lands in 
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White Pine Canyon, about ten tons of hay, 
which he sold to a neighbor. That when the 
purchaser of said hay tried to travel over said 
road hereinbefore described, where the same 
runs through a portion of said Lot 8 in Section 
1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, S. L. M., 
for the purpose of taking said hay from the 
premises owned by the defendant, the said 
p:la.intiffs, their s,e,rvants, agents and employees, 
by threat of violence and force and erecting 
fences and a gate across said road and by lock-
ing said gate, forcibly prevented the purchaser 
of sa~id hay from using said road for access to 
said lands and pre,mises owned by the defendant 
and hereinbefore described, and th~reby forci-
bly prevent~ed hin1 from hauling said hay from 
the premises of the defendant. 
10. rrhat the plaintiffs have forbidden the 
defendant to in any manner use said road where 
the same paisses through said I..Jot 8, Section 1, 
To,vnship 2 South, Range 3 East, S. L. M., and 
have threatened the defe~ndant with violence if 
he attempted so to do. 
11. That defendant greatly fears and is 
jus.tly and reasonably apprehensive that the 
plaintiffs \vill in the future continue to inter-
fe~e with the free: use of said road by the de-
fendant and by persons with whon1 he has busi-
ness, and by the public generally for vehicular 
traffic, and for the driving of livestock thereon 
and will thereby do .and continue to do irrepar-
able damage to the defendant and his lands and 
improvements, aforesaid, unless the plaintiffs 
be by this Honorable Court enjoined from so 
doing. 
12. Tha.t defendant iR without any plain, 
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sp~L\dy or adt.\quate l't?'lllt.\dy at hnv in tht~ prem-
l~es. 
\\.liLl{~~}\)1\~, dt.\feudant prays as f()llows: 
1. That the plain tirrs take nothing by their 
eLnuplnint herein and that the sante be by this 
Honor(\ble ('!ourt dislllissed. 
~- That thL~ said plaintiffs, their servants, 
agents and empluyees be by this Court perma-
nently enjoined from obstructing or in any other 
manner interfering with_ the free use by the de-
fendant. his ser\ants. agents and employees and 
by the public generally. oi the road running 
through Lot ~' Section 1, To,vnship 2 South, 
Range 3 East, S. L. lL, in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and leading into the premises of 
t.C.e defendant in said Section 1. for the purpose 
,,.f \ehicnlar traffic and driving livestock over 
said road. That in the meantime and until 
a futher order of this Court, the said plaintiffs 
their servants. agents, and employees be re-
strained from doing any of the said acts. 
3. That said road hereinbefore described 
b~ declared by this Court to be a pubic high-
way, and that the right of the defendant to the 
use of said highway for all purposes, including 
the driving of livestock over the same be qui-
eted and confirmed. 
4. For such other and further reli·ef a c;; 
may be just and meet in the premis~es~ and for 
defendant's eost of suit." (Italics ours). 
Plaintiffs filed their duly verified reply to the 
above affirmative allegations of defendant's answer 
and to defendant's counterclaim wherein they deny 
genemlly the allegations therein contained, and deny 
generally that any ''public highway'' ever existed 
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over the phtintiffs' land (defendants to the counter-
claim). 
At the beginning of the trial, plaintiffs expressly 
dismissed without prejudice their law action where-
in they sought to recover damages, and offered proof 
in support of their equitable suit for injunctive re-
lief, by introducing their abstract of title showing 
clear and unincumbered title, and failing to 
show any fight of way, easement or public hig-hway. 
'J~he allegations in respondent's ans\ver B!ld 
counterclaim upon 'vhich he appar011tly relies for_a.n 
affirmance of the judgment below~ is found in par-
agraph 14 of his answer, as follo,vs: 
'' That there is no\v and has he-en for 
more than sixty years past 3J well traveled 
road up said! White Pine Canyon * * ·)!< That 
said road is a public high,vay and has been 
used continuously by the defendant and by 
his predecessors in interest and by the- afore-
said owners of land.in said Whit~ Pine Ca.n-
yon and vicinity and by the public generally, 
and espe·cially by the residents~ of Park City 
and Summit County, State of Utah, for more 
tha~n sixty ye,ars p-ast.'' 
In paragraph 5 of respondent's counterclaim 
he a1leges: 
'' That salid road is a public hi_g-h,vay. '' 
He further alleges that the same has b'een usN! 
for more than "'sixty ye~ars past" a.nclthat :said'road 
runR thru a -·-portion of Lot 8, a tract o'f hind belong-
ing to plaintiffs. 
In parHQ"ranh 6 of defendant's counterclaim he 
allf'l¢es ( rPfClr1~in.g to the roarl de1scribed in pn,ra-
graph -5) +l1at it 'vaR "at thP timP of tl1~ comnl~ence­
ment of this action a public ~i.ghwAy by prescrip-
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tion and by baYing bet.~l ust~d el}ntinuously, opP.nly, 
notoriously, a.nd under a. clnim of rig·ht by- tht\ public 
generfilly ~md by the defendant and his predcces-
~ors in int~r~st for more than t"·l,nty years. 
The abov~, from our vi~"lJL)int at least, consti-
tutes all, ~Uld the only material and essential allega-
tions of defendant· s counterclaim t ha.t in any way 
forms the ground-"~ork or founda.tion for the Find-
i.ngs, Conclusions andd Decree complained of. 
Subdivision :~ of the prayer of said counter-
claim is as follows : 
'• That said road hereinbefore described 
be declared by this Court to be a public high-
way. and that the right of the defendant to 
the use of said highway for all purposes; in-
cluding the driving of livestock over the same 
be quieted and confirmed. '' 
Defendant. in support of the foregoing allega-
ti~ns of his counterclaim, sought to establish by 
proof that there had been a Public Highway for 
sixty years or more extend·ing up and dou;n White 
Pine Canyon. The proof shows White Pine Canyon 
to be situate about three miles from Park City, ex-
tending in the northeasterly and southwesterly di-
rections. and of a width varying from one-fourth of 
a mile to ~ mile and a half. WhiJe the proof of re-
spondent and counterclaimant showed that there had 
been a means of travel. such as roadways for logg-
ing, paths for moving livestock, and for pedestrians 
up and down the canyon since the early settlement 
of Park City; it likewise showed that such roadways 
and paths had changed locations from time. to time 
to meet changing conditions and requirements. 
There ''?as no proof that the particular Public 
H-iah1rOJJ, rlescribed in the Findings and Decree 
complained of and hereinafter referred to, was ever 
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us,ed by the public, or in fact ever existed. The 
proof shows conclusiV1eJy and without contradiction 
that in recent years there was laid out by plaintiffs 
and their predecessors a private roadway, which 
was used by others only by means of gates and only 
by plaintiffs' express permission. 
Aftert the testimony for both sides· ·had been 
concluded, the derendant brought to ·the witness 
stand one· R·. G. Heath, an engineer whom the de-
f.endant during the cours.e of the' trial had induced 
to make measurements of tlie ID'e:tes, bounds, vari-
ations, courses, diV1e,rgenee1s. ·and distances: of plain-
tiffs' private roadway, and plat the same, from the 
point ·where it ente,rs their, gate at the northeast 
corner of their land-Lot 8-· until it passes thru 
the gate on the south side of their land, and there-
upon asked and obtaJined leave to off,e:r as su1·-
reb·uttal the' testimony of the witness H,e,ath, in 
which he described by met'e's, bounds, variations~ 
courses, divergences and distances, pla,intiffs' said 
private roadway from the entrance of their prop-
erty up to and beyond their housP. and offered in 
evidence the plat (Defendant's Exhibit 1) of such 
privatr roadway so pre~pared by the witness during 
the period of the trial, which oral evidence and -plat 
were admitted over pla[n'tiffs' objection and ex-
ception. ( · · 
This evidence,· was offered on the seventh -last 
day of the trial- and the objections and exception8 
referred to appe1ar on pa~e 551 of the reporter's 
transcript, ahd on page 649 of this record · a.s num.-
bered and certified by the1 Clerk of the Court, as 
follows : 
'' MR. SULLIVAN :e If the· Court please, 
I· obje-ct to that~ first upon the ground that the 
map~ upon it's face to· everyone familiar with 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
this coutroversY i~ ~t:·lt'-t.•Xl)la.Hatorv. SPcond. 
w ~ w 
if that map i~ iutt\nded to ~lunY w"ltut I appr('-
hend, and v;hat coun~t.\1 ~tatoo yp~~terday, to 
~ho'Y a surYt:\y of the r•Jad\\~ay. then ''"t.\ objt.\ct ~ 
Yarious other grounds. One is, that the line 
of this rond is not st•t out (Uld contained in the 
complaint in tl1is c.ase. aB it should have been, 
and thoe complaint in this c.ase was demurred to 
as I remember. \l' e object to it no'v as incom-
petent, irrelevant. immaterial, and not proper 
rebuttal, and in addition that there is not suffi-
cient allegation in the complaint to admit the 
proof that is now offered. 
THE COI'.RT: You mean the counter-
claim! 
MR. ST:LLI\~ .... -L,: Yes, counterclaim. 
THE COl~T: Objection overruled. 
MR. Sl"LLI\ ... .A....\: Exception.'' 
Thereafter the trial Court made Findings~ Con-
clusions and Decree that this particular roadway-
plaintiffs' private roadway -from the gate at the 
east boundary of plaintiffs' land, near the northeast 
corner thereof, was a public highway and decreed it 
as such, by metes, bounds, variations, courses, diver-
gences and distances. 
A portion of paragraph 9 of said findings is as 
follows : 
9. That said road,vay leads from that pub-
lic highway commonly known as the Park City 
highway~ and passes over and along what is 
known as Trottman 's Lane, and thence on to 
the lnnds of the )Waintiffs, and the center lin~ 
of said ro~dway. as it passes over the lands of 
tl1e plaintiffR, is described as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. 14 
Commencing at a point North 1320 foot and 
W eet 4472 feet from the quar~er corner, east 
side, Se-ction 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 
East, Salt ·Lake Meridian, .and running thence 
South 31 deg. 40 min. West 248 reet; thence 
South 54 deg, 41 min. West 154.3 feet ; thence 
South 1 de·g. 27 min. West 139.7 f-eet; thence 
South 64 deg. 53 min. West 144.6 feet; thence 
S.outh 48 deg. 3 min. W·est 298 feet; thence 
South 63 deg. West 136.3 feet; thence South 54 
deg. 21 min. West 194.5 fe,et; thence South 4:5 
de g. 48 min. West 203.3 feet; thence South 52 
deg. 22 mjn. West 414 ·feet; thence South 42 
deg. 59 min, West 52.3. feet, to the gate. 
And the Court finds that in the us•e of said 
roadway the public generally and the defendant 
and his predecessors in interest have used and 
occupied SIJ/td roadu;ay to the extent of one a,nd 
one-half rods on each side of said center line 
above described making·said roadway three rods 
'lvid(f, as the srMn e passes through the lands of 
the· plai11tifJs, and the Court finds thal three 
rods is the 'width of said roadway and that said 
width· has· been and is: necessary' to. the,·enj-oy-
ment of said r0adway· for the purposes· for 
which it has been used and is now beirlg used 
by the p1.tblic generally, and by the defendant 
and his predecessors in int~e~rest. The Court 
finds that said rondwny ( refeerri1tJJ to thA o'f!.e 
above described} has been t~ed by the pubhc 
generally, openl'N, notoriously, contiHuously end 
uninterruptedly, adversely and under claim o.f 
right· for rnore than fifty years last past. and 
that the defendant and his predecessors in in-
terest hn1'e relied, and do rely upon said road-
~vay as a public highway." (Italics ours). 
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The Court then t~ntt..\r~ it~ dt\t•n\t\ in part n~ t'ol-
lo,vs : 
·' 1·r IB FlTR~rHER ORDERED, AD-
JuDGED AND DECHEED tha.t tlH~re is a 
road,Yay _,rhich is a publio high\\·ay, leading 
f1·om the high,ray referred to as the Park City 
His~~-;sy~ beginning at a point where a lane 
-known as Trottman 's Lane, intercepts said 
Park City H!.ghway, and running thence over 
and along said 'rrottman 's Lane southerly to-
wards White Pine Canyon~ until said roadway 
l"€'aehes the north boundary of plaintiffs' said 
land, and thence over and across Lot 8, above 
described. belonging to the plaintiffs, from the 
north boundary to the south boundary thereof; 
and said roadway~ as the same passes over 
plaintiffs ' said land is three rods wide; that is 
to say, one and one-half rods on each side of 
the oenter line thereof, which said center line 
is described as follows. to-wit: 
Commencing at a point North 1320 feet and 
W e~t 441;§ feet from the quarter corner, east 
side, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence 
South 31 deg. 40 min. West 248 feet; thence 
South 54 deg, 41 min. West 154.3 feet ; thence 
South 1 deg. 27 min. West 139.7 feet; thence 
South 64 deg. 53 min. West 144.6 feet; thence 
South 48 deg. 3 min. West 298 feet; thence 
South 63 deg. West 136.3 feet; thence South 54 
deg. 21 min. \Vest 194.5 feet; thence South 45 
de g. 4R min. West 203.3 fee~; thenoo South ~2 
deg. 22 min. West 414 feet; thence South 42 
deg. 59 min, West 52.3 feet, to the gate. 
''IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant, 
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his ag_ents, repres.entativei and employees and 
successors in interest, have the right to use said 
roadw~y hereinbefone described for the driving 
of sheep, cattle and other livestock, and for all 
kinds of traffic, in the use, occupancy and en-
joyment of said lands belonging to the defend-
ant, and (or) his successors in interest. 
"IT .IS FURTHER ORD·ERED, AD-
JlJDGED AND DECR.EED that the plaintice, 
and each and all of th{ll.r agents, representa-
tives, emp,loyoo's· and (or) successors in interest 
are perpetualy enjoined a.nd restrained from in 
any manner obstructing or interfering Wiith the 
use, occupancy and enjoyment of said roadway 
by the defendant, his succe'Ssors in inte·rest and 
their a.gents, representatives and employees, 
and by the pubUc generally, as the same passes 
over and a.cross the plaintiffs' said lands here-
inbefore described.'' 
Paragraphs o and 7 of appellants' Assignments 
of Error are a.s follows: 
(6) The Court abused its discretion and 
erred in permitting the defendant at the close 
of the trial and overr plain tiffs ' objections a.nd 
exc.eptions, to prove by its. engineer Heath, un-
der the guiser of 'sur-rebuttal;' ~the me·tes, 
bounds, variations, courses and distances of the 
roadway described in defendant's .Amtended 
Counterclaim and in the Findings and Decree 
herein, but not set out in the original eounter-
cl~a · 
(7) The Court erred in permitting proof 
by counterclaimant of the survey by his en-
gineer Heath, made during the trial, over plain-
tiffs' objections and exceptions~ and in making 
its Findings, Judgment and Decree as to the 
metes, ~ounds, variations, courses and dis-
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tances of the rond,v·ay us SE:'t forth: in the judg-
ment and decree, bt~eau~t.~ same was not involvcJ 
in the i~~ue~ n~ frnml~l in this l'Hsl\, and w ns 
not iuvcJlYed in the triall)f the ea~l\ until all thP 
evidenctlo of :both partit.~s was fully l'.nnlpltl\tl\d. '' 
Paragraph~ 1 to ~~ iuclu~iYl\ of ~\ppt\llanb;' As-
signments of Error, art:_)! a challenge of the suffi-
ciency of the eYidence to justify the judgment and 
decree herein. 
Appellants rely mainly upon two propositions: 
1. The alleged Public Highway sought to be 
described in defendant· 5 counterclaim was not de-
F-cribed "ith sufficient certainty to justify the trial 
Court in admitting the evidence of the engineer 
Heath, or oi admitting in evidence the plat prepared 
by the engineer Heath- Defendant's Exhibit 1-
nor was the alleg-ed Public Highway described in 
in defendant's counterclaim with sufficient partic-
ularity to justify th~ Findings, Conclusions and De-
cree complained of .. 
( 2) Thern was no evidence that the particular 
roadway described in the Findings of Fact and De-
cree was ever u9ed by the public or the defendant, 
~ave and except by means of gates, and save and 
Except for but two or three years p:cior to this suit, 
and save and except by plaintiffs' or their prede-
cessors' express permission, thru and by means of 
gates. :i 
At the time of preparing Assignments of Error 
herein, plaintiffs' counsel had the impression that 
counterclaimant and respondent had obtained leave 
of Court and filed an amended counterclaim setting 
forth with exactness the metes, bounds, variations, 
cour~es, divergences and distances of the roadway 
claimed~ but now, upon an examiaation of the re-
cord, 've find that no such amended pleading was 
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filed by respondent, although _the record shows that 
the Court was quite willing, and even suggested that 
such amendment be filed; \Yhich accounts for some 
reference in our .A .. ssignments to the error of the 
Court in allowing such a.mend1nent. 
"'T e will discuss the two propositions abov:e set 
out, in their order. 
'],here was no sufficient allegations in defend· 
ant's counterclaim upon which the Findings and 
DecDee here can be permitted to stand. 'J1he coun-
terclaim wholly fails to sufficiently, and as required 
by law, de£cribe by me~tes, bounds, va.riations, 
cours,es, divergences and distances, the alleged pub-
lic highway. · 
In Volume 19, C. J., under '' Eas.ements, '' and 
at page 1001, Sec. 267, the law is announced as 
follows: 
,,. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION OF 
OF EASEMENT.- The complaint must de-
scribe thet easement . so as to sho\v the nature, 
extent, and location of the right cla,lmed, in or-
der that a definite decree n1ay be· Pnt~ered. '' 
There are many cas,es cited in Corpus Juris in 
support of the foregoing text, among which is the 
case of T.everone v. 'Veakley\ (Ual.), 101 P. 304. 
Subdivision :3 of the of the! syllabus is as follows: 
'' EJ\REMENTS (SPc. 61 ~)-ACTION rro 
}jST.l\.RTJTRfi - NECESSI'rY OF EXA.C'T 
DESCRIPTION IN PLEADING·. 
Where it is soug·ht to have it decreed that a 
person's realty is subje-ct to a use or eas,e·ment. 
in favor of another, it must be described in the 
pLeadings \vith such certainty as to enable de-
fendant to de-finitely kno'\\r exactly "rhat portion 
is so claimed. 
{Ed. Note.- For other cases S(l!€' Ease-
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ntent~, Cent. Dig., ~t.·l~. 141; .J)oc. Dig. Seo 
61 ~ ). " 
The Supreme Court of C'nlifornia, in cliseussing 
the sufficiency of pleading-s in a suit to esta.blish a 
public high"-ay, uses this language : 
· ~ Plaintiff soug-ht by this action not only 
the abatement of a particular alleg·ed o bs truc-
tion erected by defendant's testator and com-
pensation for injury caused thereby, but also 
a tlecree L'sta.blishing bet,VIOOn the parties the 
fact that certain of defendant's property, con-
sisting of a strip of land three-eighths of a mile 
long, was subject to plaintiff's use as a public 
highway or as a private right of way, and en~ 
joining defendant from maintaining any ob-
struction on any part thereof. The decree 
grants this relief as to the whole strip of land. 
It goes without saying that where it is sought to 
have it decreed that real property of a person 
is subject to a use or easement.in favor of an-
other, the property affected must be desc-ribed 
in the pleadings mth such certainty as to en-
abe th~ party against whom the claim is made 
to definitely know exactly what portion of his 
property is so claimed, and the judgment es-
tablishing the validity of the claim must. be defi-
nite and certain as to the property affected." • 
(Italics ours) . 
In the instant case the Findings and Decree are 
definite and certain, and the testimony of flf. .. ath, 
and plat prepal'led by him and admitted over our 
objection, is definite and certain, but the pleadings 
which are a necessary and indispensable foundation · 
for the evidence and decree, are fatally defective. 
\\' e submit that a case cannot be found in the 
books where a definite, specific decree such as here, 
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has been p~.rmitted, by an appellate Court, to stand, 
where there is no attempt in the pleadings to define 
or describe the highway, roadway or easernJent, 
sought to be judicially subjected to public or pri-
vate us'e'. 
A portion of the syllabus in the case of Fox v. 
Pierce (Mich.), 15 N. w.; p. 880, is as follows: 
''A bill to establish a right of way, and to 
enjoin encroachme,nts upon it, cannot be sus-
tained where it does not furnish the moons for 
declaring exactly what the right is, and the 
shape, dimensions, and precise locality which 
it occupies, and the proofs show nothing but an 
oral agreem,ent for its establishment, and such 
occasional variations in the bounds of the lo-
cality as to make it impossible ~o determine 
where it originally existed.'' 
The Michigan case above cited, involved a pas-
sageway in the city of Detroit. In that case the 
plaintiff made a map showing the· exact location and 
its connection to and with other prop'e,rty and at-
tached to it and made a part of its complaint, but 
the Court held that such method failed to conform 
to that exactness required in the pleading that is 
obtained only by a survey, an exact "tie-in" of the 
. J1roposed easem1ent er drive\vay with definite, fixed 
points covered by thrl general city survey. 
It ought not require text-books or Court opin-
ions to satisfy the judicial m.ind that any complaint 
(in the instant ca.se a counterclailn), upon which it 
is soug-ht to establish a judg1nent or decree of Court, 
must coVie-r the subject-matter so to be adjudicated 
\vi th as much~ or more, spe·cific exactness as the 
judgment or decre·e sought. To illustrate : Could 
it, or "rould it be contended for a moment that a 
party, se1eking to quiet title to a five-acre tract of 
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hu1d, could llt~8cribe hi8 land in his plt~adiug by ~ny­
i11y th~H i1. \Ya8 in l...tll ~' 8t\etit)Jl 1, rfO\\'ll::-\hip :J 
~uurh. l~angt\ 3 bH8t. in \\"hitp Pine CnnytHl, thrt"P 
miles llln·tlnYt\8t ot Park City. and upon such conl-
plaint ba8t\ a d~.ree 8t.\tt iug: forth au t\xaet, correct, 
detailed description of hi::; TIYt\-aer~ tract 1 The 
ans"\\-.er 1nnst be negntiYP. 
Xo\\-, can a plaintiff ~in the instant case coun-
terclaimant). because such tract is long and narrow 
as a public highway~ l)btain a judgm€'Ilt and decree 
by any le~s definite, detailed description in his 
_pleading than would be required if he sought to 
quiet · title to a rectangular tract embracing fiV'e 
acre~·! Certainly not. 
PlP-adings have a definite, fixed place; are in-
tended to meet a definite f!equirement in juclicial 
procedure... Especially is tlus true in the American 
Sta::e~. as well as under the English Conunon Law. 
Xot only was the counterclaim fatally defective 
in failing to set out by metes, bounds, variations, di-
vergences, course~ and distances, but all the evi-
dence of oounterclaimant, except that of the en-
gineer Heath, which was admitted over plaintiffs' 
objections and exceptions, was ·equally defective in 
failing to c.onform to the metes. bounds, variations, 
di\e!'gences. cours~s and distances contained in the 
Fincl~_ngs and Decree herein. 
Further, the testimony of Heath, and defend-
ant's Exhibit 1, each relate solely to a present way 
or road- neither relate in any manner to the old 
way attempt0Cl to be here claimed by the defendant; 
neither is even an attempted description or survey 
of thfll claimed ancient highway. Both relate to a 
rf)adway~ the location, metes, bounds, coursies, diver-
gences and distanees of which are conclusively 
shown by the. evidence of all witnesses herein to be 
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a changed roadway- not the original or claimed 
way. 
The law as announced in this State, and as re-
cognized in all the States, is so definite· and ce1rta.in 
on this essential requirement, in both the pleading~ 
and the proof,as not to admit of argument. 
The evidence, until the sur-rebuttal of the en-
gineer Heath~ was as indefinite and uncertain as 
wel"le the pleadings. The evidence was in effect 
along the same general line of the pleadings, namely, 
that there~ had been a. road, roads~ cow-paths or 
"rhat not, up vVhite· Pine Canyon for' many years. 
'rime and printer's ink will not permit a re-
ha~shing of the testimony of the witnesses in behalf 
of the counte~rclaimant touching the genernlity of' 
logging roadR, eo,v-paths, etc.., up this canyon for 
fifty years. 
rrhe te)stimony of the witness "Tilliam Archi-
ba~ld, covering many page·s. is illustrative of the! lack 
of that exactne·s:s requj.red by law to establish a pub-
lic highway. His testimony deals with roads up 
and down this canyon in the, early days, and years 
before title by Government Patent pass.ed to tbe 
plaintiffs or their predeeessors, and ye·ars before 
title by Government Patent passed to the dPfendant 
or his predecessor. 
Tha~t thPre have been wagon road~ and cow 
paths up and down this canyon at various points 
from its e·arliest history, is not disputed; but co"r 
paths or logQ"ing roads on the south side of the creek 
or evP~n on thP north sirle of the creek, mrtnv rods 
from thP. nlaintiffR' pre~Ren1- private road. 'vbiel1 ori2"-
inal logging roads and cow paths have long- sincP 
been aba1ndoned and g·rown over with underbrush, 
and 'vhich weDe Pstahlisbed lone- vearR beforP· patent 
passed to plaintiffR or the~ir predecessors, can by no 
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law. furni~h any ft)Ulh.la.tion for dt.\olaring plaintiffs' 
priYate road. as sur,-~\yt.\d and de~L~ribeti in tht.\ !4,i nd-
ing:~ and Deer~~. a Public Hig-h\\-ay. 
Certain road~ up and dow··n th€'8t." canyons were 
recognized by the GuY~rnment engineers at the 
time the GoYernment surYey and the t}oy~rnment 
plat '\Yere made, but not the rond\\-ay tl~sc.ribed in 
the Decree complained of. 
The Government fie-ld notes (Exhibit D) and 
the Government rectograph copy of official plat of 
Township 2 South, Range 3 East (Exhibit E), are 
~xplained. if explanation was required, by the testi-
mony of engineer E. H. Burdick, on pages 342-350 .. 
and map prepared by him (Exhibit F). It will be 
noted from these Government records that the 
roads extending over Lot 8 - the land in contro-
versy- at the time of the Government survey, 
about 1902. were no where near the plaintiffs' pres-
ent private roadway as specifically described by the 
testimony of the -engineer Heath. 
\\ e submit there is absolutely no evidenoo to 
show that the private roadway described by the 
engineer Heath has boon in existence even as a pri-
vate roadway, for a period of more than' five or six 
years, and during such time has been used by the 
connterclaimant and his predecessors, if at all, by 
means of g-ates and by permission of the plaintiffs 
and appellants. 
The roads shown on the G<:>vernment rectograph 
copy of plat, Exhibit E, and likewise shown by t:Re 
Govflrnment fi~ld notPs. Eyhibit D, and illustrated 
bv the t~timonv of Mr. Burdick and his plat, Ex-
hibit F, show t~o main traveled, well defined roads, 
which beyond all reasonable doubt wrere. the only 
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evidences of roads over Lot 8 at the time, of the Gov-
ernment survey. One, of these roads, designated on 
Exhibit F as road ''A'' approaches Lot 8 fron1 the 
north, at a point more than half the distance from 
the east to the west line of Lot 8, .and passes thn1 
Lot 8, oy,e,r the west line, and onto Lot 7. The other 
road, designated as road '' D'' approaches J.;ot 8 on 
the east boundary line thereof, and a short distanc-e 
south of the northeast corner of Lot 8, and extends 
south on the south side of the creek, and passes out 
'Of Lot 8 and onto Lot 9 about two-fifthsi of the dis-
tance from the1 east to the west line· of Lot 8. 
Road '' B '' is the· road that the ·witne·ss Street 
described as passing between the home where· his 
mother died, and the cre·ek, at the tim~e he, was a 
small boy. 
The evide,nce· furnished by the Government re-
cords and the testimony of the 'vitness Street, are 
in no vvay contradicted by the· t,e,stimony of any wit-
nesses in this case. 
The witnesses on behalf of counterclaimant tell 
of a road or roads ''up and down'' White. Pine Can-
yon. The Governm·ent plat and field notes show 
two roads up and down White Pine Canyon, namely 
Road "A." and Road "B", neitbJe,r of which are 
identical with nor parallel to, nor at any point near 
the road de-scribed by metes and bounds in the testi-
mony of the witness Heath, or in the plat furn-
ished by the witness Heath, nor can they be· con-
strued to he, in any \vay identified, or even connected 
with the easement or public highway described in 
the de·cve~e· herein. 
We might d·w .. ell at le1ngth upon the· character-
the · indefinit~e,ness of the roadway up and down 
White Pine Canyon as testified to by respondent's 
'vitnesses, but th0! lack of sufficient definiteness in 
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upon n cnrt~l'ul t'XHJllinatitnl nnd perusal of the ab-
stract and c)riginal rt'\?.ord la\rt'in. but it i~ sufficient 
to say that ~Yt\n though th~t~ pleading~ hat' have de-
seribed ~nell rc..Hhl"·ny with ~u t'fieil\ll t part ieularit y, 
·w·hich they did lll)t. the tl'Stinlony of th~ '"itnes~es 
fell far short of making ~Yt\n a p;·inHz. fac·ie case for 
eounterclaimant and rt•spond~Ht. 
In \~olume 9, R. C. L., p. 35, Sec. 35. the rule 
is laid down that in order to obtain an easement by 
prescription, the claimant n1ust us~ the right of way 
continuously and without variation as to the line or 
roadw-a~- of the easem~nt. The right cannot be ac-
quired to p:1.ss over a tract of land generally. It 
must he C•)nfined to a specific or definite line. Citing 
many case~. among -which is the case of S. H. Oro-
shier v. John M. Brown, 25 L. R. A., N. S., p. 174. 
In Schnler ..barger v. A. H. Johnstone (Wash.), 
116 Pac., 8-!3; 35 L. R. A., X. S., p. 41, the first part 
of the syllabus is as follows : 
., A private right of way cannot be secured 
by a prescription over uninclosed land.'' 
Also see note at bottom of page 941. 
The rule seems to be well fixed that the mere 
permissive use by the owner to his neighbor to pass 
over land and after the owner fenced, by making 
gates for the convenience of the neighbor, no suffi-
cient facts in such act is found to warrant the con-
clusion that the neighbor's use was hostile or ad-
verse to the owner, and henc.e could not s-ett in mo-
tion the law of adverse possession or be invoked in 
aid of the clai.J:n of having obtained a right by. pre-
scription. 
In gflnera1, a private ea~ement for a right of 
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way cannot be acquiroed over uninclosed land unless 
the use is such as to convey to the owner reasonable 
notice that .a claim is made hostile to hin1. 
'Vhere the O"\Vner of uninclosed ·hind~, over 
which his neighbors had been in the habit of pass-
ing, left gates and bars in a f'e:nce which he erected, 
that act, inste,ad of indicating a surrender or acqui-
esence in the right of persons to pass, e-vidences a 
diffe-rent intention. 
In case of Funk v. Anderson, 22. Utah, 238; 61 
Pae., 1006, the rule s.eems to require tweuty years 
to obtain a right by pre,scription, aild the 
same rule pr,ervails in case of Rio Grande 'V f stern 
Railroad v. Salt Lake InVJestment Comp.any, 35 
Utah, 528; 101 Pac., 586. 
''A prescript~ve~ right to an ·easement can 
only ariSie after use and enjoyment for a period 
of twenty years.'' (From syllabus). · 
Funk v. Anderson, supra. 
Adverse poss.ession can be, acquired in no 
other manner than that pr1e!Scribed by c·omp. 
Laws 1907, Sec. 2866, so the title to land cannot 
be acquired by prescription as at common law.'' 
(From syllabus). 
Rio Grande Western Ra,ilroad v. Salt Ijake 
Investment Co., supra. 
"An ease·ment in land may he acquir1ed by 
a continuous use for 20 ye,ars. '' (From sylla-
bus). 
Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Salt Lake 
Inv-e·stment Co., supra. 
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In case of Jones ,.. \' HJl Boohove (Mas~.), 61 
X. \\' ., 3±:2. it i:S -held. that \Yht\n.' tllPrP \VHS an PX-
pres~ graut by au. iiH.tiYidual to a railn>ad for a 
right or \Yay. the l'onrts 'vill presumte tho abaudnn-
ment of the rig·ht ()f ,,-ny "-hpn the railroad. con1-
pnHy tu•)k up ir~ track, it~ tit~.::., and rt\UlOYed the 
bridge thnt "~as e~sential to the operation of its 
railroad OYer this easement. X o definite length of 
time "-as required to create an abandonment. 
In ,-olume ti. :@ed. Statutes Ann., p. 498, Sec. 
~-!:--;-. under subdivision 18, entitled ''RIGHT OF 
\CA.Y O, .... ER PUBLIC L.-\_...~DS," a very brief en-
actment made July ~G. lStiG. seeks to give a right 
o.t ·way for construction of highways over public 
lands. The foot-notes to this section a.re very elab-
orate, and it seems that the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon, in the case of \\ allowa County v. Wade, 43 
Ore., 253. attempt to construe what the rr. S. Con-
gress meant by the above section. 
Th~re seem to be a great many citations . on 
page 499 of said \"r ol. 6, Fed. Statutes, where various 
northwestern States have sought to get some mean-
ing to the section above referred to. 
" Under Comp. Laws 1907, Sec. 1115, pro-
viding that a highway shaU be doomed ·to have 
been · dedicated · to the use of the public when 
continuously ~used as a public• thoroughfare' .for 
ten years, use· imder private right ·is insuffi-
cient to show. dedieation, and such use, however 
long, does not make the way public, and the 
mere fact . that, the public also use it without 
objection from the owner ·will not make the way 
public.'' (From syllabus). 
Morris v. Blunt; et- al., 49 Utah, 243; 
161 Pac~, 1127. 
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''A prescriptive easement does not arise 
in seven years by ana,logy to the statute barring 
action to recover realty when _a plaintiff was 
not s1eized of the property within Heven years, 
such statutes not applying to rights of way or 
easements, but prescriptive right can arise only 
by adverse use and enjoyment under claim of 
right uninterrupted and continuous for 20 
years.'' (From syllabus). 
Morris v. Blunt, supra. 
'' Evidence held insuffici·ent to show ac-
quisition of highway easement by prescription; 
the use having been interrupted at various 
tin1es during the alleged prescriptive period." 
(From syllabus.). 
Morris v. Blunt, supra. 
''A cla,im to a right of way by pr.escription 
cannot be supported "rhere the way has been 
allowed as a. matter of accommodation, and 
claimant's use of it has not been such as to 
give the landowner notice of an adVIerse user.'' 
(From syllabus). 
La pique v. Morrison (Cal.) 154 P., 881. 
''"There defendant and his te-nants had 
been in the hal;lit of pHssing over an uninclosed 
strip of plaintiff's land for eight years, but had 
never claim101d that they had the right to use 
the land to plaintiff or his grantor, a finding 
that defendant had not a prescriptive right to 
the use of a way over the land should not bP 
disturbed." (From syllabus). 
Clarke v. C'la.rke (Cal.) 66( P.a.c., 10. 
'' The alle:ga,tions of a complaint in a snit 
to enjoin interfteTence with the use of land did 
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not ~htn\· a right bnsed on dedication, where it 
allegt\d merely that for 30 YL\ars plaintiffs, thl\ir 
predtlel'~~sl'r~, and the public had L)}->l\nly u~t.\d 
the land as a high\\·ay. '' (},rt.)lll syllabu~). 
}_,ai"r et al. Y. 'Yht)ehYright Const. Co., 
-!~} l~ tah, 214; 163 l)ac., ~5ti. 
· · The oomplnint in an action to enjoin in-
terference "ith the u~e of land as a highway 
did not show a right based on adverse user, 
where it did not allege thaf the use of the land 
"~as adverse and under a claim of right.'' 
(From syllabus). 
Farr etal '· Wheelwright Const., Co., 
. supra. 
Easement by prescription must be acquired by 
twenty years' user after patent issues, as no 
prescriptive rights can be acquired against the 
Lnited States. 
Lund Y. \\ ... ilcox, 34 lTtah, 205; 97 P., 33. 
A prescriptive easement arises .only by an ad-
verse use and enjoyment thereuf, continuous 
and and uninterrupted for twenty years under 
a claim of right. 
Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah, 227; 
26 P., 291. 
Yeager v. ,V.oodruff, 17 Utah, 361; 53 
P., 1045. 
Coleman v. Hines, 24 Utah, 360; 67 P., 
1122. 
'~ In order to acquire a private easement 
in the nature of a right of way over t.he lands 
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of another, the claimant 1nust have used the 
same openly, continuously, and adversely for 
20 Yle1ars, during all of whith time the title to 
the land over 'vhich the easement is clai1ned 
must have beem out of the U nit<td States." 
(From syllabus). 
Bolton v. Murphy, 41 Utah, 591; 
127 P., 335. 
4
' The use, for mor1e than 1.,00 years, of a 
well-known and well-defined roadway from a 
public road to a great pond, by hunters~ .fisher-
men, picnic partie·s, oolehrators on public oc-
casions, and by whomsoever chose, 'vi thout o b-
jection and without obstruction, doe'S not estab-
lish a way by pre'Rcription or dedication, wher€· 
it does not appear that such use was not ''~th 
the express or implied permission of the owners 
of the land. 
Acceptance hy public authoritieB is ne·ces-
sary to create a public way by dedication." 
(From syllabus). 
Slater v. Gunn (Mass.) 41 L. R .. A., 268. 
'' Mere user of a right of way over an-
other's land, who had kno,vl1edge· the-reof for 
a period of 33 ye·ars,' but without claim of right 
or title, is insufficient to establis b a right of 
way by prescription, under Code, Sec. 3004, 
providing that the use of an easement is not 
evidence of a claim of right, but the fact of ad-
verse possession must be established by evi-
dence independent of use, etc.'' (From sylla-
bus). 
McBride v. Bair (Iowa.) 112 N."T., 168. 
''A vested right to a right of 'va~r may be 
acquired by use· for a sufficient length of time. 
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It mu~t be occupit\d nnd u~t.\tl n.s n right, und not 
1uerely a~ a iaYor er l•riYilegP g-ranted by tho 
tl\Yuer of the s~rvient lands.'' 
Johnson v. Lt\\\·i~, 14 8. \\"., 4li6; 
47 .. -\.rk., 66. 
''An easement l)~~ p~seription cannot aris~ 
out of an ~O'Te{\ment. license ·or n1e-rt.\ neigh-
borly accommodation, but must be acqui~ed 
adversely.'' (From syllabus). 
Pinheiro '· Bettencourt (Cal) 
118 P .. 941. 
·~"Where defendant. before acquiring a. right 
of way over plaintiff\~ land, by prescription, 
mad~ a material deviation from the previously 
traveled way to avoid a washout in the old way, 
such denation broke the continuity of th~ use 
required by law to establish the prescriptiv~e 
right." (From syllabus). 
Lund v. Wilcox, 64 l,..tah, 205; 97 Pac., 33. 
Justice Frick. speaking for this Court in Lund 
v. Wilcox, supra. \ery aptly, clearly and concisely 
stated the rnle that has come down to us from the 
statutes and adjudicated cases in the various States 
for the last half century, in the following language: 
" There is another reason why respondent 
cannot be decreed a right of way over appel-
lant's land. As we have pointed out, the road-
way was changed in 1900. This change broke 
the continuity of the use by respondent. Jones, 
in his excelle;nt work on Eas~ments, in section 
295, states- the law upon this point as follows: 
'Aprescriptiv~ right of way cannot be acquired 
by tacking together two distinct p~riods of use 
(lf two separate ways, thoue-h · one ·"\Vas aban-
doned for the other with ·the consent of the 
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landowner, and the two pe1riods together would 
amount to the prescriptive time requisite to 
give a pliescriptive right of way. It is essential 
that the use should relate s.tricty to the id6uti-
cal way over which the right is claimed. A way 
imports a right of passing in a particular lin<t, 
and not eve1rywhere, OVie'r the land upon which 
the right may be claimed.' This does not mean 
that .a person using the right of way may not 
deviate .at all from the traveled rut or track, 
to the e.xtent, at least, that this may become 
necessary in a I"e,asonable use of the right of 
V.'"ay; but it does mean that the claimant may 
not abandon on€1 track or right of way and adopt 
another. In I( urtz v. Hoke, 172 P.a., 165; 38 
Atl., 549~· it is held that a variation of 20 feet 
from the trave1led road is fatal to continuity of 
us,e.. It is generally held by the Courts that a 
deviation such as occurred in the case at bar 
destroys the continuity of use required by law. 
'f'he rule is illustrated and applied in the fol-
lo~Ting cases: o,vens Y. Crossett~ 105 Ill., 354; 
Rrvan v. EaRt Rt. Ijonis. 12 Ill. App., :390; 
P1eters v. Little, 95 G-a., 151, 22 S. E., 44; ~~ol­
lendore v. Thomas, 93 Ga., 300, 20 8. E., 329. '' 
''A use under a. mere licens'e' 'vill. not ripen 
int·• an easement by pre~~eription. '' (From 
syllabus). rr . -~ 
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. 1-Ia.skett (I{an) 
67 P., 446. 
See: Ma.ra.zzani v. 1Jnited State~s Fuel 
Co., 65 Utah, 1231 234 Pac., 531. 
Barboglio v. ·Gibson, 61 Utah, 314; 213 
Pac., 385. 
Sche,ttler et al. v. Ijynch. 23 Utah, 305; 
64 P., 955. 
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In ea~t.\ of 'Yild Y. Deig et al., 4~~ Ind., 4:>;,, tla~ 
Court quoh:\s L\H.lley (\nlst. 1~iu1., p. t)~>U, ns t ollow:;: 
· · It i~ oonet~lt'i on all huuds t lut t t ht.' lt\g-
i~lature has no po'ver. in nuy ease, to take thP 
property of one ind.ividual and p~•~s it ovt\r to 
anolher \\ithout rt\fert\llt~ h) ~onlt.\ usP to '" hieh 
it is to be applied for the public benefit. • • • It 
seems not to be allo"·abl~. therefore, to author-
ize private roads to be laid out across th~ lands 
of un"illing parties by au .ex~reise of this right. 
The easement in sueh .. a case ""ould be the- prop-
erty of him for whom it ''as established.'' 
··.A roadway used by the public over gov-
ernment land does not become a public highway 
for mere user for 20 years. or by prescription, 
under Rev. St. Sec. 2477 (L. S. Comp. St. 1~•01, 
p. 1367). granting a right of way for construc-
tion of highways over public lands not reserveq 
for public uses .. , 
Pross '· State, 41 So .. 875; 147 Ala., 125; 
10 Am. Dig., p. 63, Sec. 4. 
''A road leading from a river to a highway 
was used by those owning adjoining lands to 
haul wood and stone, but this limited use was 
not under claim of right, and the road did not 
lead to anywhere in particular; there being no 
bridge at the place where it approached the 
river. The road was never used by the public 
to any extent. and a part of it was always 
roug-h and unsafe for general use. H~ld: in-
sufficient to establish a highway by prescrip-
tion." 
Fairchild v. Stewart, 89 N. W., 1075; 117 
Iowa. 734; 10 Am. Dig., p. 64. 
Proof of public tr~vel over wild and unoccu-
pied land on different tracks, as suited the conven-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
ience of travelers, whose cours:e was shaped with 
r,eiference to high and low wate·r, the land bordering 
on a river, is insufficient to establish a highway by 
user. 
Lyle v. Lesia, 31 N. W., 23; 64 ~1ieh., 16; 
10 Am. Dig., p. 64. 
" We do not think the testimony as t\) the 
land used for travel up to the time of Petti-
bone's survey is definite enough to establish a 
highway by user. The· land was wild, unoccu-
pied, and uncultivated. The testin1ony shows 
there wer,e several tracks, and people· traveled 
all over the bottom, as suited their convenience; 
shaping the,ir course also in reference to high 
and low water times.'' 
Ijyle v. I__Jesia, supra. 
~ee case San I3ernardino National Bank, Pt al. 
v. tT ones, et al. (CaL) 271 Pac., 1103, to the effect 
that a purchaser who obtains title to patented pro-
perty is required only to examine the titl,e record 
and to make such observations on the land for ease-
Inents or other claims as the ordinary prudent per-
son would make,· and when he has done this, his title 
cannot be impeached for some road,vay, e~asement, 
or other claim,ed right not disclosed by the record 
and not clearly a,nd plainly open to viP"\V upon in-
spection. 
The trial Court apparently overlooked the rule 
of law so clearly and fully outlined and de·fined by 
this Court in the case of Morris v. Blunt, SU1J'l'a, 
when it made its Findings and De-cre8! herein, as 
well as ¥then it made the so-called enlarged and 
ext~nded restraining order he:rein during the course 
of the trial n,nd on the 14th day of September, 1928, 
(Anst. 32-33). 
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This ~o-ealled enlarg-ed und t-xtended restrain-
ing orde-r, "··hich appl\ars on pages 4-l nnd -t.;> of the 
transcript t~-\..h~t. 32-33). "·as by its language and 
verbiage so s"-t~eping, as "·e con~t rut.~ it, as to pre-
vent appellants, o\vuers of the rt\al property, from 
interfering with respondent in the driving and graz. 
ing of his shet•p and other li,·t)stoek upoti the \\ .. hole 
of said Lot S: for said ''lllte Pine Canyon Road had 
not at that time been in any "·ay, shape or form 
identified by m~tt,:ls, bounds, variations, courses, di-
vergences and dista11res. and in fact the said so-
called ·. White Pine Canyon Road,'' as it crossed 
Lot S, ns shown by the old trails, consisted of many 
roads and trails in many directions, and by said 
~o-called extended 3Jld enlarged restraining order 
there ''as no width fixed or prescribed of said road, 
-no metes. bounds~ variations or divergences pro-
vided for in said order, and said order amounted 
in legal effect to a restraining upon plaintiffs from 
interfering with the defendam.t in trespassing his 
sheep and other livestock, without limit of time, 
upon plaintiffs' garden, poluting and destroying 
plaintiffs' culinary water, tramping and eating their 
meadow lands, the garden, and entering the very 
door-yard. 
In fact, if under such restraining order de-
fendant's sheep and other livestock entered the 
hom~, the milk-house or other out-buildings of the 
plaintiffs, they would have been violating the 
Court's order to have interferred. 
We mention the foregoing to illustrate 'vhat to 
our mind was a complete lack of legal kno,vledge on 
the part of the trial Court and respondent's counsel 
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touching the rights of a land-owner- home-owner 
-to protect such land and home against trespass~ers 
under the so-cal1ed guise that such trespasser was 
trailing his live1stock over a so-called vVhite Pine 
Canyon Road. 
Up to the time of issuing such restraining order 
it had uot occurred to respondent's counsel the ne-
cessity of describing the· proposed road claimed to 
be a Public Highway, with any n1ore particularity 
than ''the \Vhi te Pine CH111yon Road ove:r Lot 8. '' 
The language. of the order re.fe·rred to and 
complained of at the time same was entered was 
just as indefinite and uncertain as defendant's 
pleadings, and as defendant's evidence up to the 
time that the witness He!ath \Vas called to the stand. 
If the defendant's idea of the1 location of the 
so-called ''White, Pine Canyon Road'' took it thru 
plaintiffs' garden, thru their n1eadow lands, past 
their front door, or into their house, and defendant 
sought to drive his sheerp thereon, plaintiffs would 
be in danger of violating such order by resisting. 
The right of a home-owner to proteet his hon1e 
against tre·spass and de·struction was, \V~ ahYays 
thought, not only a sacred right but a natural duty. 
\\r e also caJl the attention of this Court to th~ 
fact that althoug·h this restraining ordeT \Vas sought 
to be va:cated by motions. and reque1sts on the part 
of these appellants in the' lower Court, such restrain-
ing: order still stands, unlP1ss it he deemed that the 
san1P \n1,s superceded by the final decree in this case. 
Th0 restrnining· .order referred to is mentioned 
here only to illustrate the apparent lack of appre-
ciation and apparent lack of kno\vledge of the· ]a\\~ 
of Public Higlnvays and Easen1e-nts in this Stat~ by 
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~Ollle t)f t ht:\ part it"~ l'OllC.el"Ut\d 111 t ht\ t riaJ 0 t' thi~ 
ease. 1 ~··i ::"~ 
In e~.Hll'lu~itHl pern1it u~ to ~ay thn.t thPrP· i~ no 
sufficit'nt ple-ading~ and no sufficient evidence upon 
""'hich the final decrt.'~ in thi~ cnsp can staJH.i, Rllld 'v\.~ 
respectfully submit that the same should oo re-
versed. 
ED'\,.IX D. HATCH, 
G. M. SlTl.LIVAN, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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